Theorem.' A number of papers have already elaborated on this point. (See, for instance, Medema 1994 , 1999 , 2002 , McCloskey 1998 , Usher 1998 , and Fox 2007 .) My aim here is (i) have a clear idea about the significance of the contradiction between the meaning of the 'Coase Theorem' and the original message of Coase in his 1960 article by way of examining some of the most cited and recent literature mentioning the 'Coase Theorem' and (ii) account for why the 'market for ideas' (Coase 1974b ) has failed to correct the misrepresentation which has long been reported, clearly and repeatedly, by Coase himself (Coase 1981) as well as many others in a number of publications.
In order to accomplish the first task I have conducted a survey in which I studied 40 articles mentioning the 'Coase Theorem' so as to see whether (and in what ways) economists have subscribed to the 'Coase Theorem' in their works. The survey resulted that of the most cited and recent articles referring to the 'Coase Theorem' 75 percent misrepresented Coase 1960. (For details about the survey, see below) [3] . Why did this failure happen and why did the misrepresentation remain uncorrected for so long? In order to explain this, I use a simplified model of path dependence and argue that the evolution of the 'Coase Theorem' features a property of intellectual path dependence in economics: the second-generation models built upon the 'Coase Theorem' have failed to replicate the results of the previous generation (i.e. Stigler 1966 and others) and the controversy in the original message of Coase (1960) has remained unresolved. The evolutionary mechanism that gives rise to such results is 'replication failure.' 'An economic view of replication failure in science suggest that errors and mistakes are a constant aspect of the scientific endeavor … [T]he continuous presence of faulty research is a by-product of scarce resources being focused on a quest for innovative discoveries' (Wible 1998: 43) . The main reason for such contradictions in the history of ideas not to disappear easily (or not at all) is that the history of ideas does not always function so as to fix errors fully. In other words, the 'market for ideas' does not operate like a perfect market and the effects of several small events, such as errors and misrepresentations in analyses, often remain uncorrected for long periods due to high 'epistemic costs' of replicating old findings. This suggests that the scholarly life of economists is a positive transaction costs world in which negative externalities (e.g. misrepresentations of ideas) are not always and perfectly selfcorrective. Positive feedback loops in the world in which intellectuals live and operate (such as journals, conferences, and other informal meetings) do not allow perfecting solutions to come about so easily. The invisible hand in the market for ideas, so to speak, often operates undesirably and errors frequently remain uncorrected.
The essay consists of three parts. In the first part, I provide an overview of Coase's 1960 article and show what the main message of Coase (1960) was and how Stigler interpreted it in his 1966 book. In the second part, I summarize the findings of a survey in which I examine the ways in which the most cited and recent articles on the 'Coase Theorem' use Coase (1960) or rely on the methodology of Coase (1960) in their works. The third part is on how replication failure works and how it can be used as an explanation of the unresolved controversy in the evolutionary history of the 'Coase Theorem.' Finally, conclusions follow.
Coase Theorem Proper and the 'Coase Theorem' As Economists Know It
The main point in Coase's 1960 article, 'The Problem of Social Cost,' was to provide a criticism of the established theory of negative externalities. According to Coase, accounts of negative externalities were inadequate; the price mechanism was not easily able to solve the problems that arose out of the harmful effects of individual actions on others. Economists, since Arthur Cecil Pigou, have believed that taxes and other kinds of governmental regulations were the best ways of diminishing the negative effects of individual behavior. In view of that, the government should restrain those responsible for the 'harmful effects' of individual action in the market. Although this was not unwise, Coase argued, such a solution would depend on whether the 'gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm' (Coase 1960) . There is no single solution to every problem in the market. Economists should be more concerned with the consequences that happen in actual cases -not merely with the consequences that happen on the blackboard only.
For Coase, the problem was to understand the causation between the parties in which one party is supposed to inflict harm upon the other. The problem featured a reciprocal nature: 'To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A,' wrote Coase, 'The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.' Carrying out market transactions (such as conducting negotiations with parties, drawing up a contract, reaching an agreement about the terms of the contract, and so on) were costly -'sufficiently costly at any rate,' wrote Coase, 'to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost' (Coase 1960) . In other words, the positive transactions cost world in which we live does not always allow parties to conduct negotiations that end up with an efficient (re-)allocation of resources and rights. Under positive transaction costs, 'the initial delimitation of rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates' (Coase 1960) . Then, assigning private property rights (no matter to whom) might be a solution to the problem of social cost as negative externalities are not self-corrective. In other words, in the world we live we need a legal system that prevents one party from inflicting harm on another, instead of a ruling state that punishes, by way of introducing taxes, the party responsible for the harm. The problem is, therefore, to decide on the appropriate social arrangement for possible harmful effects.
This requires a case-by-case investigation of different ways of handling the problem. [4] Coase introduced his view in 1960. But the 'Coase Theorem' as economists know it has become established in economic theory only after Stigler's third addition of his Theory of Price (1966) . (The first edition of the book appeared in 1952. It did not mention any of Coase's works.) According to Stigler, Coase's 1960 article raised important issues about the efficiency of markets, government intervention, and property rights. In a famous passage, Stigler said thus: '[t]he Coase theorem thus asserts that under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal. It is a more remarkable proposition to us older economists who have believed the opposite for a generation, than it will appear to the young reader who was never wrong, here' (Stigler 1966: 113) . Having introduced the 'new' conception into economic theory, Stigler, in his later career, did not seriously return to any other original publication of Coase but cited Coase (1960) in his more recent works only twice, in 1983 twice, in and in 1989 twice, in (see Stigler 1983 twice, in and 1989 . The 'theorem' has since become an important topic of investigation. Coase did not argue that the pricing system worked without costs. The reason why he used the example of zero transaction costs was (i) heuristic (Zerbe 1980) and (ii) he showed that even under the assumption of zero transaction costs, the Pigouvian system was 'inadequate' and 'incorrect' (Medema 1995) . Therefore, we cannot reduce Coase (1960) to the 'Coase Theorem.' In fact, Coase complained in his Nobel Prize Lecture in 1991 that his original message has long been misunderstood. Almost 50 years after Coase first published his 'The Problem of Social Cost,' the consequence of the initial condition under which Coase's contribution was first formulated (Stigler 1966 ) is not eliminated. The 'market for ideas' has failed to correct the error fully even today. 'I would not wish to conclude,' reported Coase (1981) , that, while consideration of what would happen in a world of zero transaction costs can give us valuable insights, these insights are, in my view, without value except as steps on the way to the analysis of the real world of positive transaction costs. We do not do well to devote ourselves to a detailed study of the world of zero transaction costs, like augurs divining the future by the minute inspection of the entrails of a goose.
In effect, Stigler's interpretation of Coase (1960) has made Coase's contribution disappear. The 'Coase Theorem' in actuality had been stated long before Coase, and therefore does not belong to the works of Coase, but of Adam Smith. In other words, the 'Coase Theorem' existed even before Coase (Friedman, Mimeo) . The 'core' of the 'Coase Theorem' was empty (Aivazian and Callen 1981) . One would never need the 'Coase Theorem,' as Coase himself reports also, to say that 'people will use resources in the way that produces the most value' (Hazlett 1997) . This amounts to saying that we are living in a world without transaction costs. Coase (1960) has dominated the history of economic ideas for five decades.
2. None of the articles in Category A, B, and C (30 articles in total) subscribe to the Coase Theorem
Proper. Publications right after Stigler's Theory of Price (1966) as well as the most frequently cited articles on transaction costs and other related fields fully adopted Stigler's interpretation. Two articles (Kelman 1979 and Lemley 1995) reported the controversy about the 'Coase Theorem' but nevertheless did not adapt the correct interpretation in their works.
3. Not much has changed after Coase's Nobel Prize speech: none of the ten most cited articles after 4. The most cited article on the 'Coase Theorem' (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990) Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998) : 'When combined with the notion that opportunity and out-of-pocket costs are equated (see fundamental principle two), this yields the Coase theorem -the idea that initial assignments of entitlements will not affect the ultimate allocation of resources so long as transaction costs are zero.' Korobkin (1998a) : 'The Coase theorem is generally understood to predict that contracting parties will bargain to the efficient allocation of rights and responsibilities, irrespective of initial entitlements if and only if transaction costs are low. Consequently, in a Coasean world, parties will agree on efficient contract terms if transaction costs are low, irrespective of the substance of default rules. The corollary to this application of the Coase theorem is that when transaction costs are high, contracting parties will not contract around inefficient defaults.' Krier and Schwab (1995) : 'Absent any impediments to bargaining, an initial mistaken (inefficient) assignment of an entitlement can (will) always be corrected by subsequent transactions between the parties.' Elhauge (1991) : 'The Coase Theorem provides that, no matter how the legal rule assigns initial rights or liabilities, the efficient outcome will always result if private bargaining in unimpeded by transaction costs or other obstacles.' Kaplow and Shavell (1996) (1988: 69) in the following terms: Given traditional assumptions of substantial knowledge, perfect rationality and the absence of both transaction costs and income effects, the assignment of legal entitlements in cases of two-party incompatible land uses will be neutral as to the goal of allocative efficiency. In simple terms, the counterintuitive thrust of the theorem is that it does not matter whether the law imposes liability on an activity or not: the market value of the activity to A as against the market value of its absence to B will determine whether the activity goes ahead or not purely as a matter of efficiency.' Lee and Sabourina (2007) : 'This paper, by introducing complexity considerations, explores the extent of the validity of the Coase theorem. In particular, we highlight the role of "transaction costs" in explaining why individuals may not fully exploit mutual gains from trade via bargaining and negotiation. The central message of the paper is that, when each player has a preference for less complex strategies (at the margin), only efficient equilibria arise in complete information models of bargaining/negotiation without transaction Nutter (1968) : ' [Coase] showed that, whenever the costs of market transactions can be neglected, the 'damaging agent' will make the same calculation of marginal cost whether charged with responsibility for damages or not.' Mumey (1971) : 'Coase contends that with no transaction costs, victims of social costs will, in the absence of liability placement by law, offers bribes for abstention to inflictors of the costs.' CATEGORY (D): Most cited 10 articles on the 'Coase Theorem' after 1991 Korobkin (1998b) : 'In The Problem of Social Cost, the foundational article of the law and economics movement, Ronald Coase suggested that when transaction costs are zero, the initial allocation of a legal entitlement is irrelevant to its eventual ownership. Assuming no transaction costs, the Coase Theorem predicts that if part A values an entitlement more than does party B, A will keep the entitlement if it is initially allocated to him, and he will buy it if it is originally allocated to B. This powerful insight depends on the behavioral assumption that an individual's valuation of entitlements does not depend on ownership; that is, A values an entitlement neither more nor less if he is initially allocated that entitlement than if it is initially given to B.'
An Explanation: Replication Failure
The mechanism that has given rise to a discrepancy in the economic literature about the contribution of Ronald Coase is 'replication failure': economists thinking that Coase's contribution was important could and should have re-checked the theorem from the 1960 article instead of simply reproducing the conclusions of Stigler's 1966 book but they never did so until recently. Today, the 'Coase Theorem' has turned into a phenomenon of intellectual path dependence in which a small event -a (mis-)interpretation of an original contribution -grew so big -the 'Coase Theorem' -that it has dominated the entire economic literature.
Replication failure is the inability or unwillingness of researchers to test the result of previously published scholarly work. It is through replication that theories and research programs are checked in terms of their defensibility, consistency, and coherency. Although replication should be an essential component of scholarly work, such an endeavor is not handled by researchers frequently because 'an economist might allocate a larger proportion of time to producing new publishable results devoting relatively less time and effort to the tasks required for replication' (Wible 1998: 25) . Replication of results is time consuming and there is no reward for scholars to repeat another's work. No significant research devotes time and effort to replicating the findings of earlier theories and research programs without compensating their economic loss.
Instead, researchers rely on the results of papers published in academic journals and they simply 'reproduce' their findings without examining its significance and validity (Mirowski and Sklivas 1991: 154). James Wible reports that the reason why replication rarely takes place in scholarly life is that 'science is more complex than mechanical reenactments of simple experiments.' Many factors play important roles: for instance, processes of inference and judgment are not totally individual but rather a social phenomenon. It is difficult to replicate certain experiments without the specialized knowledge of earlier researchers. Sometimes, derived results of earlier works could be unreplicable: data may be lost, technical possibilities may not allow researchers to set up identical experimental environments, there may be informational asymmetries, and so forth and so on. Moreover, attempts by rival scientists and graduate students to criticize and publish new findings on older data as part of their routine scientific doings are construed as hostile acts (Wible 1998: 30) .
However, scholarly work is 'chain-connected.' Subsequent research depends on previous studies.
Findings of prior studies are used as input for upcoming research. For researchers, replication failure is an economic phenomenon. That is to say, there is an economical item that is often neglected by epistemologists, time. To put it in a straightforward way: economic behavior in markets is sensitive to the opportunity costs of time. When researchers start off a new research project, they allocate time between replicable and unreplicable research. 'The economizing of resources thus exposes science to mistakes,' writes Wible (1998: 31), At some point, these mistakes will be discovered and they will have to be corrected. From an economic point of view, there needs to be a balance between resources devoted to replication in its simpler forms and innovation. Attitudes and reward structures which are skewed toward innovation may set science up for replication failures of many types. But mistakes need to be corrected or they will impede scientific progress and innovation at some point.
Authors, referees, and editors of journals often assume earlier findings are valid without retesting them in significant ways because replication takes time and this imposes significant costs on researchers. Bypassing replication generates the probability of genetic (i.e. reproductive) errors that had occurred in an earlier study but not noticed in time. In scholarly life, it is expected that such errors will be corrected as scientists do further research on the subject matter. But because of the costs of running such tests, some errors may pass unnoticed and be left uncorrected. This is a source of intellectual path dependence in which scientific markets operate in the absence of an 'invisible hand' that could have prevented errors from happening or corrected them in the long run. Seeds of intellectual lock-in are stored in the scholarly market within the epistemic costs organically attached to pursuing scientific research.
Originality of the issue, as is formulated by Wible, is that not all research fails to replicate earlier findings. A considerable amount of time is in fact devoted to the replication of results. Only a certain proportion of findings are used without being tested by a significant method. Therefore, the problem is, 'by its very nature,' small. Certain mechanisms, such as replication failure, have an influence only on untested results that are miniscule in proportion to the amount of tested results. But, in practice, small errors grow really big. Replication failure operates in the following way: While a theory or research program spreads among scholars due to its intellectual merit, there is also an economic side to the progress of every research program.
This economic side has to do with the costs arising out of the time that must be allowed to replicate the results in the scope of other scholarly works. Economic development of a theory examines the dynamic relations among scholars as well as their products (i.e. publications, conference meetings etc.) that positively feed back upon each other in mutual support with further evidence and further argumentation. The qualitative resonance among scholars is unique: a little achievement or a little error in scholarly theorizing may spread fast and broad. Consequences of such events in similar courses of history can even result in 'fraud.' 'Fraud in this context,' writes Wible, 'is the deliberate violation of scientific principle for personal material gain and professional advancement' (Wible 1998: 44) . Whether the 'Coase Theorem' can be called a 'fraud' in the above sense is a different matter. What is certain in this case, however, is that a small event -Stigler's interpretation of Coase's contribution -was an error that lasted until today without being corrected fully and has generated an intellectual pathology in history. The problem of the social cost of Stigler's misunderstanding of Coase's writings to the community of intellectuals has been the failure of markets to correct an error that has lasted for decades.
Endnotes
[1] See also Stigler 1985: 75-80. [2] For a survey of Coase's contribution to economic analysis see Zerbe 1980 , Medema 1994 , and Mercuro and Medema 2006 . * Works considered for column 'Stigler': Stigler (1966 , and 1975 (A): MOST CITED 10 ARTICLES ON THE 'COASE THEOREM' * Works considered for column 'Coase': Coase (1937 , 1960 The diagram, by way of using symbols representing sequential stages and mechanisms between stages in the most simplistic form, depicts a typical transmission mechanism in the market for ideas in which decision processes of scholars failing to replicate the findings of past generations transform into intellectual paths. Boxes represent different stages in a typical decision process. Arrows with dots ( ) correspond to replication failures in the market where second generation models do not test the findings of the first generation models and principally rely on (i.e. reproduce) the results of the previous generation. Colum ( : ) signifies the costs generated during the transaction between first and second generation models where such costs take the form of epistemic costs. Epistemic costs are the opportunity costs of allowing time to replicate the results of the models in previous generations (i.e. models before the tipping point). Such costs disallow intellectuals to re-test past results and lock them into particular research programs in the long run. Bold arrows between stages ( ) show the direction of the working mechanism. Tipping point is where a small event (such as a replication error) enters the intermediary stage. Lock-in is the final stage of the process in which consequences of small events (such replication errors) grow big by way of feedback mechanisms and evolve into intellectual pathologies in scholarly life. The diagram indicates that inputs in such systems, via certain mechanisms, transform into a particular resultintellectual paths.
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The diagram, by way of using symbols representing sequential stages and mechanisms between stages in the most simplistic form, depicts the transmission mechanism in the 'market for economic ideas' in which scholarly processes of decision-giving authors after Stigler's 1966 article transform into an intellectual pathology. Boxes represent different stages in this unique process. Arrows with dots ( ) correspond to replication failure in which second generation models (Kahneman, Knetch, and Thales (1990) , Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998) etc.) do not test the findings of the first generation model (Stigler 1966 ) and principally rely on (i.e. reproduce) available results in the market. Colum ( : ) signifies the costs generated during the transaction between second generation models and Stigler (1966) . In the case of the 'Coase Theorem,' epistemic costs are the opportunity costs of allowing time to replicate the results of Coase (1960) . Such costs disallow intellectuals to re-test the result of Stigler (1966) and lock them into a particular research program -the 'Coase Theorem.' Bold arrows between stages ( ) show the direction of the working mechanism. Tipping point is where the erroneous interpretation of Stigler was published in 1966. Lock-in is the stage in which the 'Coase Theorem' is accepted as the established message of Coase (1960) . The diagram indicates that inputs in the 'market of economic ideas' such as errors in interpretation, via the mechanism of replication failure, lead to a particular result -such as the 'Coase Theorem.'
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